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Imagine a policy that adds 1 per cent of GDP a year to the fiscal resources of a large, advanced economy. This policy works like magic. The money appears out of nowhere, with no rise in taxes, no cuts in spending, no assets sold and no debt to pay back. Such a policy would have great appeal to cash-strapped governments around the world and is surely too good to exist. Nevertheless, exist it does. Any guesses? The answer is a 2014 reform to the Government Pension Investment Fund of Japan, the world’s largest pool of retirement savings, in which it took on some currency and equity risk.
想像一下，一項政策能使一個大型發達經濟體的財政資源每年增加GDP的1%。這項政策就像變魔術一樣。這筆錢似乎不知道是從哪裏冒出來的，不需要增稅，不需要削減開支，不需要出售資產，也不需要償還債務。這樣的政策將對世界各地資金緊張的政府產生巨大的吸引力，而且肯定是好到不可能存在。然而，它確實存在。猜一猜？答案是2014年對日本政府養老金投資基金(GPIF)進行的改革，讓這個全球最大退休儲蓄資金池承擔一些匯率和股權風險。
Undertaken by former prime minister Shinzo Abe, the 2014 reform shifted the GPIF from a largely domestic portfolio, with 60 per cent held in Japanese government bonds, to one that is 50 per cent equity and 50 per cent international. According to Stephen Jen and Joana Freire of Eurizon SLJ Capital, the portfolio has grown from ¥137tn in 2014 to ¥226tn today, compared with the ¥168tn at which it would now stand if the fund had kept it unchanged. The extra return amounts to about 10 per cent of Japan’s GDP, or $370bn, which must make it the most lucrative asset allocation review in history.
由日本前首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)發起的2014年改革，將GPIF的投資組合從主要爲國內投資(其中60%爲日本國債)，轉變爲50%爲股權、50%爲國際投資的投資組合。據Eurizon SLJ Capital的斯蒂芬•詹(Stephen Jen)和喬安娜•弗萊雷(Joana Freire)稱，該投資組合已從2014年的137兆日元成長到今天的226兆日元，相比之下，如果不改革，目前的投資組合規模將爲168兆日元。額外的回報相當於日本GDP的10%左右，即3700億美元，這使其成爲歷史上最賺錢的資產配置調整。
The portfolio has benefited, of course, from the weakness of the yen, which fell from roughly ¥100 to the dollar to roughly ¥150 over this timeframe, but that is the point of taking currency risk, not a lucky accident. A period of bad asset returns could wipe out some of the gains. This is, however, a policy experiment that the world should study. Here are six lessons.
當然，該投資組合受益於日元疲軟，在這段時間內，日元從1美元兌100日元左右跌至1美元兌150日元左右，但這正是承擔匯率風險的意義所在，而不是幸運的意外。一段時間的不佳資產回報可能會抹去部分收益。不過，這是一個值得全世界研究的政策實驗。以下是六條經驗。
First, Japan has reason to be grateful to Abe, who was prime minister from 2012 to 2020 before his assassination in 2022. Opponents attacked the GPIF reform as speculation with the public’s retirement savings but Abe and his advisers showed leadership, riding out periods of bad publicity when the fund’s value went down. The GPIF reform may not be his greatest legacy but it is one to be proud of.
首先，日本有理由感謝安倍晉三，他在2012年至2020年期間擔任首相，後在2022年被暗殺。反對者抨擊GPIF改革是用公衆退休儲蓄進行投機，但安倍和他的顧問們表現出了領導力，挺過了基金價值下跌時的負面報導時期。GPIF改革或許不是安倍最偉大的遺產，但卻是值得驕傲的遺產。
Second, it highlights the importance of looking at net rather than gross public debt. Japan famously has the world’s largest gross public debt at 252 per cent of GDP. Its net public debt stands at 158 per cent of GDP, with the assets in the GPIF making up a chunk of the difference. Imagine an alternative reform in 2014, which used the GPIF money to cancel government bonds. In that case gross debt would have fallen, but Japan would have missed out on the excess returns from the investment portfolio and net debt would now be 10 percentage points higher.
其次，它凸顯了關注公共債務淨額而非總額的重要性。衆所周知，日本擁有全球最大的公共債務總額，相當於GDP的252%。其淨公共債務相當於GDP的158%，其中GPIF中的資產佔了差額的一大部分。試想一下如果在2014年進行另一種改革，用GPIF的錢來對消政府債券。在這種情況下，總債務會下降，但日本將錯過該投資組合的超額回報，淨債務現在將高出10個百分點。
Third, the GPIF’s shift shows a different way to think about public finances. In some sense, a government is like the ultimate university endowment fund or life insurance company: it is designed to exist forever, it has long-term obligations to future pensioners and a huge capacity to absorb risk.
第三，GPIF改革顯示了一種思考公共財政的不同方式。從某種意義上說，政府就像終極的大學捐贈基金或人壽保險公司：它被設計爲永遠存在，它對未來的養老金領取者負有長期義務，並有巨大的吸收風險的能力。
The government can invest in public sector assets that will generate future tax returns, such as education and roads, but it can invest in private sector assets as well. In circumstances where the private sector is hungry for safe assets such as government bonds, and willing to buy them at very low interest rates, it may well make sense to issue more, increase the public sector’s leverage and invest for a higher return. Jen and Freire suggest that the US Social Security Trust Fund, which is currently an accounting entity that only invests in special US Treasury bonds, should follow the GPIF into other assets.
政府可以投資於能產生未來稅收回報的公共部門資產，如教育和道路，但它也可以投資民營部門資產。在民營部門渴望獲得政府債券等安全資產，並願意以極低利率購買這些資產的情況下，發行更多債券、提高公共部門的槓桿率，並進行投資以獲得更高回報，可能是明智之舉。Jen和Freire建議，美國社會安全信託基金——目前是一個只投資於美國特別國債的會計實體——應該效仿GPIF投資其他資產。
Fourth, the GPIF reform was relatively conservative. The portfolio shift was made consciously, with careful attention to risk, asset management by professionals and politicians kept at arm’s length. That makes a depressing contrast with an economically similar scheme in the UK, whereby local governments sought to fix their lack of tax revenue by borrowing billions of pounds from the central government, and investing it in commercial property and other assets. A number, such as Thurrock, Woking and Warrington, have got themselves into deep financial trouble. It will always be easy to confuse prudent use of the state’s balance sheet to fund long-term liabilities using long-term assets, and speculation to keep short-term tax rates low.
第四，GPIF改革相對保守。投資組合的轉變是有意識地進行的，對風險有著謹慎的關注，由專業人士進行資產管理，與政治家保持一定距離。這與英國經濟上類似的計劃形成了令人沮喪的對比。在英國，地方政府試圖透過向中央政府借款數十億英鎊，並將其投資於商業地產和其他資產，來解決稅收收入不足的問題。Thurrock、Woking和Warrington等一些地方政府已經陷入了嚴重的財政困境。人們總是很容易將審慎使用國家資產負債表、用長期資產爲長期負債提供資金，與爲了保持低短期稅率而進行的投機相混淆。
Fifth, the GPIF’s shift could apply to other pools of assets. For example, Japan is one of a number of Asian countries that maintains foreign exchange reserves much greater than it needs. If Tokyo does not want to take advantage of the weak yen to sell some dollars and retire some debt — which would be quite sensible — then it could shift some of these reserves into equities too, or hand them over outright to the GPIF. The way Hong Kong handles the investment portion of its Exchange Fund is an interesting example.
第五，GPIF的轉變可以適用於其他資產池。例如，日本是外匯儲備遠遠超過需求的亞洲國家之一。如果日本政府不想利用日元走弱的機會出售部分美元並償還部分債務(這將是相當明智的做法)，那麼它可以將部分外匯儲備轉爲股票，或者直接移交給GPIF。香港處理其外匯基金投資部分的方式就是一個有趣的例子。
Finally, there is a case to make this kind of reform early. Not only are the benefits accrued and the risks best managed over time, but the world continues to age and the demand for pension-paying assets rises with it. The return of inflation has made everybody feel better about returns but there is little sign that real interest rates — after inflation — have moved sustainably higher.
最後，有理由儘早進行這種改革。隨著時間的推移，不僅福利會逐漸積累，風險也會得到最好的管理，而且世界還在繼續老齡化，對養老金支付資產的需求也會隨之上升。通膨的迴歸使每個人對回報感到更加滿意，但幾乎沒有跡象表明實際利率（扣除通膨因素後）已經持續上升。
In finance there is never any free lunch. Return always comes with risk. But as ageing societies confront a rising fiscal burden, the success of Abe’s GPIF reform shows the merit, for governments, of thinking less like debtors struggling to pay the bills, and more like investors with large obligations, large balance sheets and a very long time horizon.
在金融領域，永遠沒有免費的午餐。回報總是伴隨著風險。但在老齡化社會面臨財政負擔不斷增加的情況下，安倍晉三GPIF改革的成功表明，對於政府來說，少從掙扎著還債的債務人的角度考慮問題，多從揹負鉅額債務、擁有龐大資產負債表和非常長遠眼光的投資者的角度考慮問題是有好處的。