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Haiti’s collapse into anarchy and gang violence has exacted a terrible human price. Almost half the Caribbean nation’s population is suffering acute hunger, thousands are homeless and life expectancy at birth has sunk to 63 years. How did a country less than 800 miles from Florida turn into a failed state and what can be done to restore a functioning government?
海地陷入無政府狀態和幫派暴力，造成了可怕的人員傷亡。這個加勒比國家近一半的人口正遭受嚴重飢餓，數千人無家可歸，出生時的預期壽命已降至63歲。一個距離佛羅里達州不到800英里的國家是如何變成一個失敗的國家的？我們可以做些什麼來恢復一個正常運轉的政府？
Haiti’s history of crisis is long and complex but the still-unsolved assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021 detonated the latest episode. A caretaker prime minister backed by the international community, Ariel Henry, proved unable to govern and unwilling to hold elections. Tens of thousands of Haitians voted with their feet, emigrating to the US or elsewhere in Latin America. The country’s institutions largely ceased to function. No democratically elected representatives remain. Drug traffickers and arms dealers profited from the chaos.
海地的危機歷史漫長而複雜，但2021年總統若弗內爾•莫伊茲(Jovenel Moïse)遇刺身亡一案至今懸而未決，引爆了最新的危機。得到國際社會支援的看守總理阿里爾•亨利(Ariel Henry)無法執政，也不願舉行選舉。成千上萬的海地人用腳投票，移民到美國或拉丁美洲的其他地方。國家機構基本上停止運作。沒有民選代表留下來。毒品販子和軍火商從混亂中獲利。
The international community has not ignored Haiti’s plight. The US and the Caribbean grouping Caricom have tried to broker a new government and muster a multinational security force to restore order. The spectre of previous failed foreign interventions in Haiti over the past 30 years — two by the US and two by the UN — complicated their task: few governments want to risk their reputations in the quagmire. Latin American governments have been conspicuous by their absence.
國際社會沒有忽視海地的困境。美國和加勒比共同體(Caricom)試圖斡旋建立一個新政府，並召集一支多國安全部隊來恢復秩序。過去30年裏，外界曾對海地進行干預，美國兩次，聯合國兩次，但都以失敗告終，這讓他們的任務變得更加複雜：很少有政府願意冒著聲譽受損的風險陷入泥潭。拉美各國政府的缺席引人注目。
A glimmer of hope emerged this month, when the US and Caricom secured agreement from Henry to cede power to a seven-member transitional council drawn from politics, civil society and business. The council would appoint an interim government with a mandate to hold elections as soon as practicable. A Kenyan-led security force would provide much-needed support to Haiti’s outnumbered, outgunned and demoralised police. The US pledged $300mn to underwrite the cost.
本月出現了一線希望，美國和加勒比共同體與亨利達成協議，將權力移交給一個由政界、民間社會和商界人士組成的七人過渡委員會。該委員會將任命一個臨時政府，授權其在切實可行的情況下儘快舉行選舉。一支由肯亞領導的安全部隊將爲人手不足、武器不足和士氣低落的海地警察提供急需的支援。美國承諾出資3億美元承擔這筆費用。
But as the international discussions on Haiti inched forward, the gangs were creating facts on the ground. This month they seized the opportunity afforded by Henry’s absence in Kenya discussing the security force to unite, break open jails, attack the airport and terrorise the population.
然而，隨著有關海地的國際討論逐漸推進，這些幫派正在採取行動。本月，他們抓住了亨利在肯亞討論團結安全部隊的機會，打開監獄，襲擊機場並恐嚇人民。
The gangs have metastasised in recent years from private militia operating on behalf of political barons to more independent forces harbouring political aspirations. Gang leaders like ex-police officer Jimmy “Barbecue” Cherizier have exploited Haitians’ revulsion at the venality of the country’s elite to present themselves as alternative leaders.
近年來，這些幫派已經從代表政治大亨的私人民兵轉變爲懷有政治抱負的更獨立的力量。像綽號「烤肉」的前警官吉米•切裏澤爾(Jimmy Cherizier)這樣的幫派頭目利用海地人對國家精英腐敗的反感，把自己塑造成替代領導人。
Unsurprisingly, the gangs reject the transition council plan and have threatened those who take part: their interest is in growing their own power and continuing their trade in drugs, arms, kidnapping and extortion.
不出所料，這些幫派拒絕過渡委員會的計劃，並威脅那些參與計劃的人：他們的興趣是擴大自己的權力，繼續他們的毒品、武器、綁架和勒索交易。
If the transitional council can start work — an uncertain prospect amid death threats against its nominees and constant substitutions of names — and the Kenyan-led security force can be deployed quickly to support it, Haiti has a chance of securing a functioning government. But those are big “ifs”.
如果過渡委員會能夠開始工作——這是一個不確定的前景，因爲其提名人面臨死亡威脅，而且不斷有人被替換——並且肯亞領導的安全部隊能夠迅速部署來支援它，海地就有機會確保一個正常運作的政府。但這些都是很大的「如果」。
There are concerns the international police force is not large or strong enough to restore order. There are also worries over the transitional council’s ability to reach consensus and its legitimacy is open to question, since its members are largely drawn from the country’s discredited elite.
有人擔心，國際警察部隊的規模和力量不足以恢復秩序。人們還擔心過渡委員會能否達成共識，其合法性也有待商榷，因爲其成員大多來自該國名聲不佳的精英階層。
Yet the reality is that the US-Caricom plan is the only one on the table, with no obvious alternatives. Increasing the muscle of the international security force and deploying it as quickly as possible would give the Haitian-led political process at least a fighting chance. The alternative is Somalia in the Caribbean.
然而，現實情況是，美國-加勒比共同體計劃是擺在桌面上的唯一方案，沒有明顯的替代方案。加強國際安全部隊的力量並儘快部署，至少會給海地領導的政治進程帶來一線生機。另一個選擇是變成加勒比海的索馬利亞。
