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The writer is chair of Rockefeller International. His new book is ‘What Went Wrong With Capitalism’
本文作者是洛克菲勒國際(Rockefeller International)董事長。他的新書是《資本主義出了什麼問題》(What Went Wrong With Capitalism)
A widening transatlantic gap is inspiring glee in the US and angst in Europe. Though their per capita income levels were similar a couple of decades ago, growth (in constant dollars) has been twice as fast since 2010 in the US than in the UK and the EU’s Big 4 economies — Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
大西洋兩岸日益擴大的差距令美國歡欣鼓舞，卻令歐洲煩憂。儘管兩地的人均收入水準與幾十年前差不多，但自2010年以來，美國的成長速度（以不變美元計算）是英國和歐盟四大經濟體——德國、法國、義大利和西班牙——的兩倍。
Why is Europe falling behind? Look at the role of government. While over time governments have extended their control over most capitalist economies, they have expanded most markedly in Europe. Until the 1980s, government spending was lower on average in the UK and the EU Big 4 than in the US. Now Europe spends far more. The burdens of an oversized state have crushed productivity growth, which is the key to rising prosperity. From 1960s postwar peaks, I calculate that productivity growth has collapsed from almost 7 per cent to less than zero in the EU Big 4. It has fallen in the US too but less drastically, dropping from 2.5 per cent to around 1 per cent, possibly due to superior tech prowess.
爲什麼歐洲落後了？看看政府的角色。隨著時間的推移，政府擴大了對大多數資本主義經濟體的控制，但在歐洲擴張得最爲明顯。直到上世紀80年代，英國和歐盟四大經濟體的政府支出仍平均低於美國。而現在，歐洲的支出卻多得多。超大規模國家的負擔壓制了生產率成長，而生產率成長是經濟繁榮的關鍵。根據我的計算，從戰後60年代的峯值來看，歐盟四大經濟體的生產率成長率已從近7%暴跌至不足零。美國的這一比例也有所下降，但幅度較小，從2.5%降至1%左右，這可能是由於其科技實力的優勢。
Records for the UK begin earlier than most. Going back to the 1690s, the UK never ran a peacetime deficit until the 1970s. It then ran a deficit in all but five of the next 50 years. The Reagan-Thatcher “revolution” of the 1980s changed only the way the state funds its expansion, by borrowing not taxing. Public debts have risen threefold in the UK and the EU Big 4 to around 100 per cent of GDP on average.
英國的記錄開始得比大多數國家都早。追溯到17世紀90年代，英國在上世紀70年代之前從未出現過和平時期的赤字。然而，在那之後的50年裏，除了其中5年，它一直處於赤字狀態。上世紀80年代的里根-撒切爾(Reagan-Thatcher)「革命」只改變了國家爲其擴張提供資金的方式，即透過借貸而不是徵稅。英國和歐盟四大經濟體的公共債務成長了兩倍，平均達到國內生產總值(GDP)的100%左右。
More government spending left less room for private competition and initiative, particularly as central banks joined governments in a campaign to eliminate business cycles. Central bank purchases of bonds and other assets exploded from near zero in the downturns of the early 2000s to record heights in 2020, reaching 16 per cent of GDP in the US and 22 per cent in the EU Big 4.
越來越多的政府支出減少了私人競爭和主動性的空間，特別是當央行和政府一道消除商業週期的運動時。各國央行購買債券及其它資產的規模，從本世紀初經濟低迷時期的接近零，激增至2020年的創紀錄高點，在美國達到GDP的16%，在歐盟四大經濟體達到22%。
As the “cleansing effect” of recessions faded, incumbents thrived. Corporate profits rose in part on oligopoly pricing power. Since 2000, sales in most industries have been concentrating in the largest firms — though on this front less rapidly in Europe than the US.
隨著經濟衰退的「清洗效應」逐漸消退，老牌企業開始蓬勃發展。企業利潤的成長部分得益於寡頭壟斷的定價權。自2000年以來，大多數行業的銷售一直集中在最大的公司身上——不過，歐洲在這方面的速度不如美國快。
Markets increasingly distorted by easy money and state bailouts also spawned “zombies” — firms that don’t earn enough to cover even interest payments on their debt. Rare before the 1980s, the latest data show zombies account for at least 10 per cent of public companies in developed markets — up to 20 per cent in the US and 22 per cent in the UK.
因寬鬆貨幣政策和國家救助而日益扭曲的市場也催生了「殭屍」——那些收入甚至不足以支付債務利息的公司。最新數據顯示，在發達市場，殭屍企業至少佔上市公司的10%——在美國和英國分別高達20%和22%，而這在上世紀80年代之前是罕見的。
In part because it lacks spending authority, the “Eurocracy” channelled its energies into what has been described as a “global regulatory hegemon”. Any company with ambitions in Europe must meet standards set by the most powerful states, Germany and France, on everything from carbon emissions to milk production.
在某種程度上，由於缺乏支出許可權，「歐盟行政體系」(Eurocracy)將其精力投入到所謂的「全球監管霸權」中。在歐洲有野心的任何公司都必須達到德國和法國這兩個最強大國家設定的從碳排放到牛奶生產的標準。
Since the super-rich own the lion’s share of financial assets, they gain most when the state rushes in to stop even minor market tremors
由於超級富豪擁有最大份額的金融資產，當政府出手阻止哪怕是輕微的市場波動時，他們的收益也是最大的
Facing both continental and national bureaucracies, it’s no surprise Europeans are more likely than Americans to cite regulation as a major obstacle to starting or expanding businesses. Many medium-sized German companies say they are considering shutting down, citing “too much red tape and higher taxes”. Many French firms dare not grow, lest they face costly rules that apply to firms with more than 50 employees.
面對大陸和國家官僚機構，歐洲人比美國人更有可能將監管視爲創業或擴張企業的主要障礙，這並不奇怪。許多中型德國企業表示，它們正考慮關閉，理由是「繁文縟節太多，稅收更高」。許多法國公司不敢發展，唯恐面對那些適用於僱員超過50人的公司的昂貴規則。
Heavy regulation creates a business environment that is friendly to mega firms with the most money and lawyers. Until the pandemic hit, start-ups were shrinking as a share of all companies in many industrial countries, including the UK, Spain and Italy.
嚴格的監管創造了一個對擁有最多資金和律師的大公司友好的商業環境。在疫情爆發之前，在包括英國、西班牙和義大利在內的許多工業國家，新創企業在所有公司中所佔的比例一直在下降。
By favouring giant companies, governments boost the wealth of corporate founders, including entrenched billionaires. Since the super-rich own the lion’s share of financial assets, they gain most when the state rushes in to stop even minor market tremors. In recent decades billionaire wealth grew faster as a share of GDP in the UK and the EU Big 4 than the US. France now has both an unusually bloated government, with spending equal to 58 per cent of GDP, and an unusually dominant billionaire class whose total wealth is equal to 22 per cent of GDP, ahead of even the US.
政府透過支援大公司，增加了企業創辦人的財富，其中包括根深蒂固的億萬富翁。由於超級富豪擁有最大份額的金融資產，當政府出手阻止哪怕是輕微的市場波動時，他們的收益也是最大的。近幾十年來，億萬富翁財富佔英國和歐盟四大經濟體GDP比重的成長速度快於美國。法國現在既有異常臃腫的政府——支出相當於GDP的58%，也有異常占主導地位的億萬富翁階層——其總財富相當於GDP的22%，甚至超過了美國。
That helps to illuminate the transatlantic gap. Add up productivity losses from oligopolies, zombies, bureaucracy, inequality and other market distortions fuelled by big government, and together they could explain the productivity slowdown. The burdens of big government are outweighing the boost from new technologies, particularly in Europe and the UK.
這有助於說明大西洋兩岸的差距。把寡頭壟斷、殭屍、官僚主義、不平等和其他由大政府推動的市場扭曲造成的生產率損失加在一起，就可以解釋生產率放緩了。大政府帶來的負擔超過了新技術帶來的推動，在歐盟和英國尤其如此。
The twist is that US President Joe Biden has turbocharged the long expansion in American spending, debt and regulation. The country’s deficit, typical for a western nation until recently, is expected to average upwards of 6 per cent of GDP — much higher than the UK and the EU Big 4 — in coming years. Once again, the US is on track to replace Europe as the land of even bigger government — and slower growth.
轉折在於，美國總統喬•拜登(Joe Biden)已經加速了美國在支出、債務和監管方面的長期擴張。預計未來幾年，該國的赤字——直到不久前，仍是西方國家的典型赤字——平均將佔GDP的6%以上，遠高於英國和歐盟四大經濟體。美國將再次取代歐洲，成爲政府規模更大、成長速度更慢的國家。