尊敬的用戶您好，這是來自FT中文網的溫馨提示：如您對更多FT中文網的內容感興趣，請在蘋果應用商店或谷歌應用市場搜尋「FT中文網」，下載FT中文網的官方應用。
The past week has produced two highs, and a deep low, for European democracy. The swearing-in of Donald Tusk as Polish premier after his electoral victory over the illiberal Law and Justice party was one high. Another was the EU’s agreement, fending off threats of a veto by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, to start membership talks with Ukraine. But, in a low point, Orbán still blocked a four-year, €50bn EU aid deal for Kyiv, jeopardising its ability to fund its war with Russia. To ensure cash flows to Ukraine in 2024, and that the EU can remain an effective geopolitical player, it must find ways to tackle its “Orbán problem”.
過去一週，歐洲民主出現了兩次高潮和一次低谷。唐納德•圖斯克(Donald Tusk)在選舉中戰勝了非自由主義的法律與正義黨(Law and Justice party)，宣誓就任波蘭總理，這是一個高潮。另一個高潮是歐盟頂住了匈牙利的歐爾班•維克多(Viktor Orbán)的否決威脅，同意與烏克蘭開始成員國談判。但是，一次低谷是，歐爾班仍然阻止了歐盟向基輔提供爲期四年、總額達500億歐元的援助協議，從而危及烏克蘭爲與俄羅斯的戰爭提供資金的能力。爲確保烏克蘭在2024年獲得現金流，並使歐盟繼續成爲有效的地緣政治參與者，歐盟必須找到解決「歐爾班問題」的方法。
EU leaders should start by being clear that Orbán is motivated largely by money. He needs EU funds to keep flowing to Hungary, boosting its economy, to underpin his support. Billions of euros have been blocked since 2021 over rule of law concerns. Hungary’s premier was last week trying to use his posturing over Ukraine as leverage to unblock the frozen funds. He also knows eventual EU membership for Kyiv would shrink the funding pie for Hungary and other central European members.
歐盟領導人應首先明確，歐爾班的動機主要是金錢。他需要歐盟資金源源不斷地流向匈牙利，促進其經濟發展，以鞏固他所得到的支援。自2021年以來，數十億歐元的資金因法治問題而被凍結。匈牙利總理上週試圖利用他在烏克蘭問題上擺出的姿態作爲籌碼，以解凍被凍結的資金。他也知道，基輔最終加入歐盟將縮小匈牙利和其他中歐成員國的資金蛋糕。
Orbán has no desire to “leave the EU”, as he said in an interview. Instead, he wants to “take it over”, with like-minded allies. What was notable last week, however, was how far Hungary’s leader remains from that goal, especially after Poland’s change of direction, and despite advances by populist leaders and parties elsewhere. Indeed, on Ukraine he was entirely isolated. With 26 leaders against him, even Orbán seemed to feel too weak to wield his threatened double-veto, instead leaving the room while the rest voted to launch accession talks with Kyiv.
正如歐爾班在一次採訪中所說，他並不想「離開歐盟」。相反，他希望與志同道合的盟友一起「接管歐盟」。然而，上週值得注意的是，匈牙利領導人離這一目標還有多遠，尤其是在波蘭改變方向之後，儘管其他地方的民粹主義領導人和政黨取得了進展。事實上，在烏克蘭問題上，他完全被孤立了。由於有26位領導人反對他，甚至連歐爾班似乎也感到力不從心，無法行使他威脅要行使的雙重否決權，在其他領導人投票決定與基輔啓動入盟談判時離開了會場。
But Orbán demonstrated his capacity to be a “spoiler”. EU capitals should therefore double down on using the tools they have to curb misbehaviour by him, and others who might follow a similar path. Now that Budapest cannot rely on Warsaw shielding it, they should make clear that triggering Article 7, suspending Hungary’s EU voting rights, is again possible, even if some states are queasy about using this “nuclear option”.
但是，歐爾班展示了他作爲「攪局者」的能力。因此，歐盟各國應加倍努力，利用現有工具遏制歐爾班以及其他可能走上類似道路的人的不當行爲。既然布達佩斯不能再指望華沙的庇護，他們就應該明確表示，即使一些國家對使用這一「核選項」感到不安，啓動第7條、暫停匈牙利的歐盟投票權也是可能的。
Having worked hard to create a more usable mechanism allowing funds to be blocked if member states go into reverse on democracy and rule of law, EU leaders should not flinch from wielding it. Orbán has now shown how this can be twisted into leverage against the EU. Although €10bn of funds were released last week after Brussels said concerns had been met, there should be no “dirty” deals to unfreeze further blocked money to Hungary without good reason, even for the sake of Ukraine. Doing so would emasculate the EU’s most credible enforcement tool.
歐盟領導人努力成立了一個更實用的機制，允許在成員國在民主和法治方面出現倒退時阻止資金流入，他們不應該在使用這一機制時退縮。歐爾班現在已經展示瞭如何將這一機制扭曲成爲反對歐盟的籌碼。儘管上週在布魯塞爾表示，相關的一些擔憂得到解決之後，100億歐元的資金被釋放，但在沒有充分理由的情況下，不應該有任何「骯髒」交易來解凍進一步被凍結的匈牙利資金，即使是爲了烏克蘭。這樣做將削弱歐盟最可信的執法工具。
On financing Kyiv, the EU must find another route — via an intergovernmental agreement of 26 states. This is messier, but can keep money flowing for now. Similar workarounds might be possible on some other policies — though not on enlargement where, as Orbán noted, the requirement for unanimity at every step creates multiple future chances for Hungary to block Ukraine’s progress.
在爲基輔提供資金方面，歐盟必須另闢蹊徑——透過 26 個國家的政府間協議。這樣做比較麻煩，但目前可以保持資金流動。在其他一些政策上也可能有類似的變通辦法，但在擴大歐盟問題上就不可能了，正如歐爾班所指出的，在擴大歐盟問題上，每一步都必須達成一致的要求爲匈牙利今後阻撓烏克蘭的進展創造了多種機會。
This latest episode has laid bare once again structural problems with EU decision-making that must be addressed now that further expansion to half a dozen or more new members is in prospect. More decisions need to be taken by qualified majority, and there needs to be greater scope for “coalitions of the willing” to press ahead with initiatives.
最近的這一事件再次暴露了歐盟決策的結構性問題，既然歐盟有望進一步擴大到五六個新成員，那麼這些問題就必須得到解決。需要以特定多數做出更多決定，「意願聯盟」需要有更大的空間來推進各項倡議。
EU states are unlikely to relinquish the need for unanimity on taking in new members — though it might conceivably be limited to the start and end of the process. For now, EU leaders will have to use what means they can to coax and shame Orbán into not deploying his veto on Ukraine. For Europe’s wider stability, it is welcome that enlargement is back on the cards. But, as it grows, the EU cannot allow its functioning to be held hostage by a small minority.
歐盟國家不太可能放棄一致同意接納新成員的要求——儘管可以想像這可能僅限於程式的開始和結束。目前，歐盟領導人將不得不採取一切可能的手段來哄騙歐爾班，讓他因爲羞愧而不在烏克蘭問題上動用否決權。爲了歐洲更廣泛的穩定，擴大歐盟是值得歡迎的。但是，隨著歐盟的發展壯大，歐盟不能允許其運作受到少數人的挾制。