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Basel III: if ever there were three syllables that could bring a grown banker to tears, these are they. In the 15-plus years since the financial crisis, the western world has been through a protracted process of rewriting regulations to protect against another 2008. The last pieces of that puzzle — conceived by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and known as Basel 3.1 — are now close to being slotted into place across the western world.
《巴塞爾協議III》(Basel III)：如果有三個位元組能讓一個成年銀行家流淚，那就是它們。自金融危機爆發以來的15年多時間裏，西方世界經歷了一個漫長的過程，即修改監管法規，以防範另一場2008年危機。由巴塞爾銀行監管委員會構思、被稱爲《巴塞爾協議3.1》(Basel 3.1)的最後一塊拼圖，如今已接近在整個西方世界落實到位。
Until recently, US banks thought they were set to come off worst. Federal Reserve vice-chair for supervision Michael Barr had gold-plated the Basel rules, provoking a fierce backlash from Wall Street’s finest. But that lobbying, and the placatory intervention of Fed chair Jay Powell, appears likely to leave US banks with a watered-down impact that will be very similar to their European rivals — an uplift of perhaps 10 per cent in their capital requirements compared with the 20 per cent or so previously predicted, according to bankers.
直到最近，美國的銀行還認爲自己將是受影響最嚴重的。美聯準負責監管的副主席邁克爾•巴爾(Michael Barr)曾爲巴塞爾規則鍍金，引發了華爾街精英們的強烈反對。但銀行家們表示，這種遊說以及美聯準主席傑伊•鮑爾(Jay Powell)的安撫性干預，似乎可能會讓美國銀行的影響減弱至與歐洲競爭對手非常相似——對它們的資本金要求可能會提高10%，而先前的預測是20%左右。
The oddest feature of the US reforms is that most small and mid-sized banks will escape tougher treatment, despite the fact that it was precisely mid-sized regional banks that were the focus of depositor jitters last year, when the likes of Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic collapsed. (Only this month New York Community Bank needed an emergency capital infusion.) Yes, the definition of what constitutes a large bank has been expanded to anything greater than $100bn, rather than $250bn, but that still leaves thousands of lenders — all but the top 99 — to pose a potential systemic risk.
美國改革最奇怪的地方在於，大多數中小型銀行將逃脫更嚴厲的處理，儘管去年矽谷銀行和第一信託銀行等倒閉時，正是中型地區銀行成爲儲戶恐慌的焦點。(就在本月，紐約社區銀行需要緊急注資）。是的，大型銀行的定義已擴大到1000億美元以上，而不是2500億美元，但仍有數千家貸款機構——除了前99家之外——構成潛在的系統性風險。
In Europe, less obvious dangers may accumulate. Last year, EU and UK banks and regulators felt quietly smug when the region’s institutions emerged unscathed from the market turmoil and client nervousness that brought down Switzerland’s Credit Suisse and the US regionals. But the way in which the EU is implementing Basel 3.1 — particularly the way it embeds a previously temporary provision giving capital relief to banks with insurance subsidiaries — is a cause for concern.
在歐洲，不那麼明顯的危險可能會不斷積累。去年，瑞信和美國地區性銀行因市場動盪和客戶緊張而倒閉，但歐盟和英國的銀行和監管機構卻毫髮無損，這讓它們暗自得意。但歐盟實施《巴塞爾協議3.1》的方式令人擔憂，尤其是其中包含了一項以前臨時性的規定，即爲擁有保險子公司的銀行提供資本減免。
Policymakers argued that this so-called Danish Compromise was justified because insurers are also closely supervised financial institutions, so they should be treated as less risky investments in bank capital terms than other subsidiary holdings. But in essence the Danish Compromise — conceived during Denmark’s 2012 EU presidency — was a sop to help banks that owned insurance operations and found themselves stretched for capital amid the eurozone crisis.
政策制定者認爲，這種所謂的「丹麥妥協方案」是合理的，因爲保險公司也是受到密切監管的金融機構，因此，就銀行資本而言，它們應被視爲風險低於其他附屬控股公司的投資。但從本質上講，丹麥在2012年擔任歐盟輪值主席國期間提出的《丹麥妥協方案》(Danish Compromise)，是爲了幫助那些擁有保險業務、在歐元區危機中發現自己的資本捉襟見肘的銀行。
Much of that stress came about because of the “doom loop” stemming from banks’ ownership of so much of the sovereign debt of their stressed home countries. The falling value of this debt led to bank losses, which then led to lending cutbacks, further hitting economies. Ironically, the Danish Compromise and the encouragement it gives to buy more bonds amplifies that risk. Some regulators and independent insurers complain the measure is a political fudge, and fought — but failed — to have it removed from the new rule book. “The impact on increasing systemic risk is massive,” says one insurer.
這種壓力很大程度上是由於「厄運循環」造成的，這種循環源於銀行持有如此多處於困境的母國的主權債務。這些債務的貶值導致銀行虧損，進而導致貸款削減，進一步打擊了經濟。具有諷刺意味的是，丹麥妥協方案及其鼓勵購買更多債券的做法放大了這種風險。一些監管機構和獨立保險公司抱怨這一措施是一種政治伎倆，並試圖將其從新的規則手冊中刪除，但未能成功。一家保險公司表示：「對增加系統性風險的影響是巨大的。」
One particular area for concern is exactly the issue that tripped up US regional banks: in the higher-interest-rate environment, large volumes of hidden losses accumulated on long-dated bonds. The value of eurozone banks’ domestic government bond exposure, currently €1.5tn, slumped nearly 20 per cent in the two years to early 2023.
一個特別令人擔憂的領域正是讓美國地區銀行陷入困境的問題：在利率較高的環境下，長期債券累積了大量隱性損失。在截至2023年初的兩年內，歐元區銀行持有的國內政府債券價值下降了近20%，目前爲1.5兆歐元。
And while European bank rules mean losses for most banks are transparently accounted for, and insurers apply similar fair-value accounting, there is a mismatch when insurance subsidiaries are consolidated into bank parent companies. Losses in the insurance subsidiary are not reflected in the bank’s consolidated accounts. (Data on insurers’ sovereign exposure is less granular, but across the European Economic Area is about €1.6tn.)
雖然歐洲銀行規則意味著大多數銀行的損失都以透明的方式入賬，保險公司也採用類似的公允價值會計方法，但當保險子公司併入銀行母公司時，就會出現不匹配的情況。保險子公司的損失不會反映在銀行的合併賬目中。(關於保險公司主權風險敞口的數據不太詳細，但整個歐洲經濟區約爲1.6兆歐元）。
The issue is troubling on other grounds, too. The politically convenient fiction that all eurozone sovereign bonds are risk-free means that banks need set no capital against them. At the same time there is less effective regulatory supervision of a so-called bancassurer because the structure of banking and insurance supervision is split between the ECB and the less muscular European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority.
這個問題在其他方面也令人不安。所有歐元區主權債券都是無風險的這種政治上方便的虛構，意味著銀行不需要爲這些債券撥備資本金。與此同時，對所謂的銀行保險公司的監管效率較低，因爲銀行和保險監管的結構是由歐洲央行和實力較弱的歐洲保險和職業養老金管理局分開的。
The final phase of post-2008 Basel III regulation will boost the solidity of much of the global banking system. But thanks to a Mexican stand-off in the US, and a Danish Compromise in the eurozone, there are still weak points. And a crisis does love a weak point.
2008年後《巴塞爾協議III》監管的最後階段將增強全球大部分銀行體系的穩定性。但由於美國國內的互不妥協，以及歐元區的丹麥妥協方案，仍然存在薄弱環節。危機就喜歡薄弱環節。
