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The aim of economic warfare is to inflict maximum pain at minimum cost. Achieving that is hard when the target is a key commodity producer. The EU’s agreement to ban most Russian oil imports reflects justified outrage at the barbaric invasion of Ukraine. But it may prove to be ineffective.
經濟戰的目的是以最小的代價造成最大的痛苦。當目標是一個關鍵的大宗商品生產國時，很難實現這一點。歐盟(EU)同意禁止大部分俄羅斯進口石油，這反映了對俄羅斯野蠻入侵烏克蘭的義憤。但它可能被證明是無效的。
The problem with oil is that it is traded internationally. Higher prices may compensate Russia for reduced volumes, as US Treasury secretary Janet Yellen argued in April. Equally, customers in the EU and outside it may swap sources of supply in response to price signals, with little ultimate impact on the Russian exchequer.
石油的問題在於它在國際上交易。正如美國財長珍妮特•葉倫(Janet Yellen)今年4月所說的那樣，油價上漲可能會彌補俄羅斯出口量下降的影響。同樣，歐盟內外的客戶可能會根據價格信號交換供應來源，而對俄羅斯財政部的最終影響很小。
The lower the level of substitution, the more powerful the partial embargo. Some countries, for example, lack refineries that can process Urals, Russia’s sulphurous main export blend.
替代水準越低，區域性禁運就越有力。例如，一些國家缺乏能夠加工烏拉爾原油（俄羅斯主要出口的含硫混合油）的煉油廠。
That is not a problem for China and India. They have already moved to fill the gap in demand for Russian oil created by self-sanctioning by European refiners and traders. India rarely bought Russian oil in the past. But it emerged as the largest purchaser of Russian Urals crude in April, according to S&P Global.
這對中國和印度來說不是問題。它們已經採取行動，填補歐洲煉油商和貿易商自我制裁造成的俄羅斯石油需求缺口。印度過去很少購買俄羅斯石油。但標普全球(S&P Global)的數據顯示，今年4月，印度成爲俄羅斯烏拉爾原油的最大買家。
Asian countries may not take up the full slack in demand for Russian oil, however, fearing retaliatory western sanctions. Capital Economics thinks Russia’s oil exports will fall by a fifth this year, even allowing for a 15 per cent rise in exports to non-western countries. But after factoring in higher prices, the consultancy estimates that Russia’s oil export revenues will be $180bn, a mere $2bn lower than in 2021.
然而，亞洲國家可能不會完全填補俄羅斯石油需求的缺口，因爲它們擔心西方的報復性制裁。凱投宏觀(Capital Economics)認爲，俄羅斯今年的石油出口將下降五分之一，即便對非西方國家的出口將成長15%。但該諮詢公司估計，在計入油價上漲因素後，俄羅斯的石油出口收入將達到1800億美元，僅比2021年減少20億美元。
The gap between Brent and Urals crude — currently $31 — may eventually fall in response to substitution. One response from the west may be to ban its insurers from covering tankers carrying Russian oil. Creating friction of a logistical kind is one way of compensating for a lack of it in markets.
布倫特原油和烏拉爾原油之間的價差（目前爲31美元）最終可能會因替代買家而下降。西方的一個回應可能是，禁止其保險公司承保運載俄羅斯石油的油輪。製造物流方面的摩擦是彌補市場摩擦缺乏的一種方式。
Even after the oil embargo is fully phased in next year, it may be more than offset by higher gas prices. The oil embargo reduces Europe’s financial complicity. It will not, by itself, sabotage the Russian war machine.
即使在明年石油禁運全面實施後，它也可能被更高的天然氣價格所抵消。石油禁運減少了歐洲與俄羅斯的金融勾結。它本身不會破壞俄羅斯的戰爭機器。
