尊敬的用戶您好，這是來自FT中文網的溫馨提示：如您對更多FT中文網的內容感興趣，請在蘋果應用商店或谷歌應用市場搜尋「FT中文網」，下載FT中文網的官方應用。
The writer is former chief of MI6 and UK ambassador to the UN
作者是前軍情六處處長和英國駐聯合國大使
We often think of the Middle East as built around the Arab world. Baghdad and Damascus were the historical centres of authority. In the 20th century, Cairo and Beirut became the region’s cultural capitals until they declined and their influence was overtaken by the oil and gas wealth of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
我們常常認爲中東是圍繞阿拉伯世界建立的。巴格達和大馬士革曾是歷史上的權力中心。20世紀，開羅和貝魯特成爲該地區的文化之都，直到它們衰落，其影響力被沙烏地阿拉伯和海灣的石油和天然氣財富所取代。
Today, it is striking that the three most assertive and powerful countries in the region — Israel, Turkey and Iran — are the non-Arab nations. Each is led by an ageing warhorse. Benjamin Netanyahu has been Israel’s prime minister for 17 of the last 28 years. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been in power in Turkey for almost 22 years, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been Iran’s supreme leader for 35 years. Like the Bourbons of France 200 years ago, they learn nothing and forget nothing.
今天，令人震驚的是，該地區最強勢和最有影響力的三個國家——以色列、土耳其和伊朗——都是非阿拉伯國家。每個國家都由一位年長的老將領導。本雅明•內塔尼亞胡(Benjamin Netanyahu)在過去28年中擔任了17年的以色列總理。雷傑普•塔伊普•艾爾段(Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)在土耳其掌權近22年，而阿亞圖拉•阿里•哈梅內伊(Ayatollah Ali Khamenei)則擔任伊朗的最高領袖已有35年。就像200年前的法國波旁王朝，他們既不學習也不遺忘。
After the humiliating calamity of Hamas’s brutal October 7 2023 attack, Israel has powered back. Its armed forces and intelligence services have turned the tables, not just on Hamas but on Hizbollah and their sponsors in Iran. In the process, Netanyahu has ignored advice from Israel’s closest friends and shown scant respect for protecting civilian lives. Long-term support for Israel has been eroded in the west but its core enemies are seriously weakened.
在哈馬斯(Hamas)於2023年10月7日發動的羞辱性災難性襲擊後，以色列迅速反擊。其武裝部隊和情報機構不僅扭轉了對哈馬斯的局勢，也對黎巴嫩真主黨(Hizbollah)及其在伊朗的支持者進行了反擊。在此過程中，內塔尼亞胡無視以色列最親密朋友的建議，對保護平民生命表現出極少的尊重。以色列在西方的長期支援有所削弱，但其核心敵人已被嚴重削弱。
Israel has shown it is a new Sparta — a small nation with unrivalled military strength. But its politicians reject the idea that a political solution with the Palestinians is needed if the Jewish nation is to enjoy enduring peace and security. Israel has no plan for Gaza beyond indefinite occupation, unless it is the unstated one of driving the Palestinians there into Egypt and in parallel annexing as much of the occupied West Bank as possible. One prediction we can make with confidence, sadly, is that an independent Palestinian state will be no closer in a year’s time than it is now.
以色列展示了它是一個新的斯巴達——一個擁有無與倫比軍事力量的小國。但其政治家們拒絕接受這樣的觀點：如果猶太民族要享有持久的和平與安全，就需要與巴勒斯坦人達成政治解決方案。以色列對加沙沒有計劃，除了無限期佔領，除非它未明言的計劃是將那裏的巴勒斯坦人驅趕到埃及，同時儘可能多地吞併被佔領的西岸(West Bank)。遺憾的是，我們可以有把握地預測，一年後一個獨立的巴勒斯坦國將不會比現在更接近實現。
As the new year begins, Israel’s attention is focused on Iran, which was the big loser of 2024. Khamenei is becoming visibly weaker, both physically and politically. The main candidate to succeed him is now his son Mojtaba. Second-generation autocrats rise to power on the back of privilege and entitlement. They don’t bear the scars of struggle or learn the hard lessons their fathers acquired. Hafez al-Assad was a ruthless leader of Syria, but he knew the limits of power and when to negotiate. His son Bashar had none of those skills. The result was even more brutality and, in time, regime collapse.
新年伊始，以色列的注意力集中在2024年的大輸家伊朗身上。哈梅內伊在身體和政治上都明顯變得虛弱。他的主要繼任者候選人是他的兒子穆吉塔巴。第二代獨裁者憑藉特權和權利上臺。他們沒有經歷過鬥爭的傷痕，也沒有學到他們父輩所獲得的艱難教訓。哈菲茲•阿薩德(Hafez al-Assad)是敘利亞的一個無情領導者，但他知道權力的界限以及何時談判。他的兒子巴沙爾則沒有這些技能。結果是更加殘酷，最終導致政權崩潰。
The experience of losing their Syrian ally should make the Iranian military wary of a dynastic succession. They will try to ensure that a new supreme leader is not all-powerful inside the regime. But new leaders of stagnating autocracies can bring surprises. Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev are obvious examples. Closer to home for Iran is Saudi Arabia’s transformation under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Each recognised their country’s vulnerability and sought an economic and political strategy, usually involving some openness to the outside world, to underpin the autocratic system for decades to come. This seems unlikely in Iran but shouldn’t be ruled out.
失去敘利亞盟友的經歷應該讓伊朗軍方對王朝繼承保持警惕。他們將努力確保新的最高領袖在政權內部不是全權掌控。然而，停滯不前的專制政權的新領導人可能會帶來意外。鄧小平和米哈伊爾•戈巴契夫(Mikhail Gorbachev)就是明顯的例子。對伊朗來說，更近的例子是沙烏地阿拉伯在王儲穆罕默德•本•沙爾曼(Mohammed bin Salman)領導下的轉型。他們都認識到自己國家的脆弱性，並尋求經濟和政治戰略，通常包括對外界的一些開放，以支援未來幾十年的專制體系。這在伊朗似乎不太可能，但也不應被排除。
A weakened regime presents an opportunity for a new negotiation, even if Khamenei senior staggers on for another year or two. Donald Trump may prefer a political deal to taking part in Netanyahu’s preferred military option to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israel will argue that Tehran will string out talks while they covertly make progress towards a nuclear weapon, the strategic case for which is now even more compelling for Iran. These are valid concerns. Khamenei also distrusts America even more than US politicians distrust Iran. It may require new leadership in Tehran before Iran changes course.
一個削弱的政權爲新的談判提供了機會，即使哈梅內伊長老再堅持一兩年。唐納•川普(Donald Trump)可能更傾向於達成政治協議，而不是參與內塔尼亞胡偏好的軍事行動來摧毀伊朗的核設施。以色列會辯稱，德黑蘭會在談判中拖延，同時祕密推進核武器的研發，而現在對伊朗來說，這一戰略理由更具吸引力。這些都是合理的擔憂。哈梅內伊對美國的信任度甚至比美國政客對伊朗的信任度還要低。可能需要德黑蘭的新領導層才能讓伊朗改變方向。
The very welcome surprise of 2024 was the collapse of the Assad regime and the opening of a path to a better future for the Syrian people. Turkey, like Israel, was a winner last year but it too has problems seizing new opportunities. Erdoğan seems to view Syria through the distorting prism of the Kurdish question, which will make it harder for Syria’s opposition leaders to come together and forge a new constitution that recognises the diversity — religious and ethnic — of their country.
2024年一個非常受歡迎的驚喜是阿薩德政權的垮臺，爲敘利亞人民開闢了一條通往更美好未來的道路。土耳其和以色列一樣，去年是贏家，但它也面臨著抓住新機遇的問題。艾爾段似乎透過扭曲的庫德問題視角來看待敘利亞，這將使敘利亞反對派領導人更難團結起來，制定一部承認其國家宗教和民族多樣性的新憲法。
Erdoğan, a remarkable survivor, has built up Turkey’s power across the region and in Africa. He has shown that a philosophy of political Islam can be successful and needn’t lead to an Islamic state and strict sharia law. In that sense, he can provide a model for Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of the HTS Islamist group that now holds power in Damascus.
艾爾段是一位傑出的倖存者，他在整個地區和非洲提升了土耳其的實力。他展示了政治伊斯蘭的理念可以取得成功，並不一定導致建立伊斯蘭國家和嚴格的伊斯蘭教法。從這個意義上說，他可以爲現在掌握大馬士革權力的沙姆解放組織(HTS)領導人艾哈邁德•沙拉(Ahmed al-Sharaa)提供一個榜樣。
There’s a lesson here for western capitals, and for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. We are right to be wary of al-Sharaa’s extremist background. But the journey of young radicals from political violence to national leadership is a well-trodden one. The diplomatic task ahead is to maximise the chances of success in Syria, by being bold in lifting sanctions, removing the terrorist proscriptions and doing all we can to support the Syrian opposition to come together.
這對西方國家的首都以及利雅得和阿布扎比(Abu Dhabi)來說是一個教訓。我們對沙拉的極端主義背景保持警惕是正確的。然而，年輕激進分子從政治暴力走向國家領導的道路是常見的。未來的外交任務是透過大膽解除制裁、取消恐怖主義禁令，並盡力支援敘利亞反對派團結，來最大化敘利亞成功的機會。
The instinct in western capitals seems to be to pay out the rope slowly and to resist Islamists on ideological grounds. But that is a path that will make it more likely that we end up either with fragmentation, as in Libya, or with a new dictator, as in Tunisia. Western countries also need to avoid the errors of the Bourbons.
西方國家的首都似乎本能地選擇慢慢放鬆繩索，並在意識形態上抵制伊斯蘭主義者。但這條道路更可能導致我們最終要麼像利比亞那樣出現分裂，要麼像突尼西亞那樣出現新的獨裁者。西方國家還需要避免重蹈波旁王朝的錯誤。