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The rise of populist and far-right parties in Sunday’s European parliament elections was partly mirrored by falls for green parties — even if the centre largely held. Five years after the euphoria the Greens experienced in 2019, when they increased their seats from 52 to 74, they slipped back to 53. The setback is unlikely to lead to a widescale rollback of EU climate policies. But it will surely mean less green ambition in the coming five years — with implications well beyond Europe.
在週日的歐洲議會選舉中，民粹主義和極右翼政黨的崛起在一定程度上反映了綠色政黨的衰落——儘管中間派在很大程度上保持了穩定。綠黨在2019年經歷了從52個席位增至74個席位的喜悅，五年後，他們的席位回落到53個。這一挫折不太可能導致歐盟氣候政策的大規模倒退。但這肯定意味著未來五年的綠色雄心將減弱，其影響將遠遠超出歐洲。
The Greens’ performance in 2019 may prove a high-water mark. In the more benign, pre-pandemic and prewar economic environment, mass rallies inspired by green groups and activists such as Greta Thunberg helped to make climate concerns a central electoral issue. In response, mainstream parties were adopting net zero pledges and Ursula von der Leyen, the then incoming European Commission president, made the Green Deal — which aims to make the EU climate-neutral by 2050 — her flagship project.
綠黨在2019年的表現可能會被證明是一個高水位。在大流行前和戰前較爲溫和的經濟環境中，綠色團體和活動家——如格蕾塔•通貝里(Greta Thunberg)——激發的羣衆集會有助於使氣候問題成爲選舉的核心議題。作爲回應，主流政黨紛紛透過了淨零承諾，當時即將上任的歐盟委員會主席烏爾蘇拉•馮德萊恩(Ursula von der Leyen)制定了旨在到2050年使歐盟實現氣候中和的《綠色協議》(Green Deal)，這是她的旗艦項目。
Unfortunately, voters began to feel the impact of green policies on their wallets and lifestyles just as post-pandemic inflation and the energy shock from the Ukraine war kicked in. Some governments exacerbated the problem through mis-steps; the botched introduction by Germany’s three-way coalition — including the Greens — of a bill to replace new gas and oil heating systems with heat pumps created a backlash exploited by the far-right AfD.
不幸的是，就在大流行後的通貨膨脹和烏克蘭戰爭帶來的能源衝擊開始顯現時，選民們開始感受到綠色政策對他們錢包和生活方式的影響。一些政府的錯誤做法加劇了問題的嚴重性；德國包括綠黨在內的三方聯盟錯誤地提出了用熱泵取代新的燃氣和燃油供暖系統的法案，引起了極右翼政黨德國選擇黨(AfD)的反彈。
Hard-right parties elsewhere made political capital out of promises to slow the transition, and centre-right parties adopted watered-down versions of the same rhetoric. EU-wide farmers’ protests over environmental regulations seen as heavy-handed provided a very different backdrop to the 2024 vote.
其他地方的極右翼政黨利用減緩過渡的承諾獲得了政治資本，而中右翼政黨則採取了同樣言辭的淡化版本。歐盟範圍內針對被視爲過於嚴厲的環境法規的農民抗議活動爲2024年的選舉提供了截然不同的背景。
The overall picture is mixed. It is far more complex than green votes flowing directly to far-right parties — though green parties performed worst in France and Germany, where the far right did best. Greens fared better in Sweden, where the far right did not surge, and advanced in Denmark — while the Labour/Green alliance in the Netherlands narrowly overtook Geert Wilders’ far-right party. Where hard-right parties did well, polling suggests concern about migration — or its effects on, say, housing costs — was a bigger factor than the “greenlash”.
整體情況複雜多樣。它遠比綠黨選票直接流向極右翼政黨更加複雜——儘管綠黨在法國和德國表現最差，而極右翼在這兩個國家表現最好。綠黨在瑞典表現較好，極右翼勢力沒有激增，在丹麥也取得了進展——而荷蘭的工黨/綠黨聯盟則以微弱優勢超過了海爾特•威爾德斯(Geert Wilders)的極右翼政黨。在極右翼政黨表現良好的地方，民意調查顯示對移民問題的擔憂——或者說移民對住房成本等方面的影響——比「綠色衝擊」更爲重要。
Yet an enlarged hard-right presence in the parliament, and the greater caution of von der Leyen’s centre-right EPP group, provide a much less propitious outlook for green policies in the next five years — which are vital to determining whether the EU achieves its 2030 climate change targets. Green laws already adopted will be hard to undo. But some, including the 2035 phaseout of the sale of new petrol or diesel cars, are due to be reviewed, and could be weakened. A less climate-friendly parliament could make life harder for Brussels’ proposal to agree a legal target of cutting net emissions by 90 per cent, from 1990 levels, by 2040. Von der Leyen seems likely to adopt a different focus, such as defence, if she secures a second term.
然而，由於議會中強硬右翼勢力的擴大，以及馮德萊恩領導的中右翼歐洲人民黨黨團更加謹慎，未來五年綠色政策的前景將大打折扣，而這些政策對於歐盟能否實現2030年氣候變化目標至關重要。已經透過的環保法律很難被廢除。但是，包括2035年逐步停止銷售新汽油車或柴油車在內的一些法律將接受審查，並可能被削弱。一個對氣候不那麼友好的議會，可能會讓布魯塞爾提出的到2040年將淨排放量在1990年的基礎上減少90%的法律目標更難實現。如果馮德萊恩獲得連任，她似乎可能會採取不同的關注點，比如國防。
Policymakers committed to the green transition need to learn lessons. They must be finely attuned to the impact on consumers, and ensure policies are well designed and communicated, with help for those most heavily affected. More targeted tax incentives to reduce the upfront costs of, say, installing solar panels or switching to electric vehicles could accelerate adoption by businesses and households alike.
致力於綠色轉型的政策制定者需要吸取教訓。他們必須密切關注對消費者的影響，確保政策設計合理、溝通順暢，併爲受影響最嚴重的人羣提供幫助。透過更有針對性的稅收激勵措施來降低安裝太陽能電池板或改用電動汽車等的前期成本，可以加快企業和家庭的採用速度。
A more compelling narrative is needed, too, on the jobs, businesses and technologies the green transition will create. The European election of 2024 might yet prove to be the peak of the far right. But amid efforts to neutralise rightwing extremism, the focus on combating the epochal threat of climate change must not be lost.
關於綠色轉型將創造的就業、商業和技術，還需要一個更有說服力的敘述。2024年的歐洲大選可能會被證明是極右翼的巔峯。但在消除右翼極端主義的努力中，絕不能忽視應對氣候變化這一劃時代威脅的重點。
