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Super Tuesday, the day on which the largest number of US states hold presidential primaries, is almost upon us. The results are baked in — Donald Trump and Joe Biden will be the winners. But the primaries may give us insight into the divide between what data shows, particularly the economic variety, and the felt experience of the voting public.
「超級星期二」即將到來，這一天是美國最多州舉行總統初選的日子。結果已經毫無懸念——唐納•川普和喬•拜登將成爲贏家。但初選可能會讓我們深入瞭解數據顯示的事實——尤其是經濟方面的變化——與選民的感受之間的鴻溝。
One of the biggest mysteries of this campaign season has been why Joe Biden has not been given more credit for America’s booming economy. Gross domestic product is up, inflation is down and the jobs market could hardly be better. And yet, consumer sentiment remains low and that will probably be reflected in Tuesday’s exit polls, which survey not only which candidates voters chose, but why.
這個競選季最大的謎團之一是，爲什麼喬•拜登沒有因爲美國蓬勃發展的經濟而被給予更多認可。國內生產總值(GDP)上升，通膨下降，就業市場好得不能再好了。然而，消費者情緒仍然低迷，這可能將反映在週二的出口民調中，這些民調不僅調查選民選擇哪些候選人，還調查選擇的原因。
I suspect those polls will tell us that economic data and voters’ felt experience are in collision with each other, or, at the very least, not correlated in the ways that we might imagine.
我懷疑這些民意調查將告訴我們，經濟數據和選民的感受是相互衝突的，或者至少不像我們想像的那樣相互關聯。
Take inflation. Yes, it’s been cooling, even as unemployment remains low and wages edge up. And yet, people don’t feel consumer price index numbers. They feel the cumulative hit from how prices of groceries, rent, gas, electricity, car insurance and other necessities have risen by more than 20 per cent in the past two or three years.
以通膨爲例。沒錯，通膨一直在降溫，儘管失業率仍然很低，工資也在慢慢上漲。然而，人們感受到的不是消費者價格指數數字。他們感受到的是食品雜貨、租金、汽油、電力、汽車保險和其他必需品價格過去兩三年上漲逾20%所帶來的累積打擊。
For most Americans, particularly younger and more vulnerable ones, the felt experience of inflation isn’t, “Hey, things are expensive but prices rises are coming down and I have more money in my pocket.” It’s anger. As Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg puts it, “My key learning [during this campaign season] has been that even when you come out of an inflationary period, people stay angry for a long time.”
對大多數美國人，尤其是年輕和更弱勢羣體來說，他們對通膨的感受並不是，「嘿，東西很貴，但價格漲幅正在下降，我口袋裏的錢更多了。」它是憤怒。正如民主黨民調專家斯坦•格林伯格所說，「我（在這個競選季節）的關鍵領悟是，即使你走出了通膨期，人們也會在很長一段時間內保持憤怒。」
That lingering pessimism is compounded by the fact that generational economic shifts (such as inflation moving above 5 per cent, which hadn’t happened since 2008) tend to imprint on people for the rest of their lives. Indeed, there is research to show that even one really tough year experienced in early adulthood is enough to change behaviour for a lifetime.
加劇這種揮之不去的悲觀情緒的是，世代經濟變化（比如通膨率超過5%，這是2008年以來從未發生過的）往往會在人們的餘生中留下印記。事實上，有研究表明，即使在成年早期經歷過一年非常艱難的情況，也足以改變一生的行爲。
I think of my British grandmother, a nurse in the second world war, who would use a tea bag multiple times. Or conversely, my boomer parents, who feel comfortable carrying a mortgage well into their retirement. Feelings drive our economic decisions, and our voting.
我想起了我的英國祖母，她是二戰時期的一名護士，會重複多次泡一個茶包。或者反過來，我的嬰兒潮一代父母，他們覺得在退休後還負擔房貸是舒適的。感受驅動著我們的經濟決策以及投票。
I suspect that this truth will be reflected not only in perceptions of prices, but also around migration and border security, which loom large as an election issue. Immigrants have, of course, always been core to America’s economic success (their impact is a net positive at both the high and low ends of the socio-economic spectrum). There’s even new evidence that suggests foreign-born workers are a key reason why labour inflation hasn’t been higher.
我懷疑，這一事實不僅會反映在對價格的感受上，還會反映在移民和邊境安全問題上，這些問題在選舉中佔據重要地位。當然，移民一直是美國經濟成功的核心(他們對社會經濟光譜的高階和低端的影響都是積極的)。甚至有新的證據表明，外國出生的工人是勞動力通膨沒有走高的一個關鍵原因。
That includes legal as well as illegal immigrants. A recent Strategas Research Partners report on how “big immigration” is key to understanding US growth notes that: “To the extent US immigration has been tough to fully measure in recent years, the reported data [showing the disinflationary impact of migration] may be underestimating this boost.”
這包括合法的以及非法移民。Strategas Research Partners最近發佈的一份關於「大規模移民」是理解美國經濟成長的關鍵的報告指出：「就近年來美國移民很難完全衡量的程度而言，報告的數據（顯示移民的反通膨影響）可能低估了這一推動力。」
It continues: “The policy enacted by some states to relocate migrants from the southern border to larger cities may have also had the (likely unintended) effect of matching individuals to regions where there was an ability to work, even if informally.”
報告繼續寫道：「一些州制定的將移民從南部邊境遷移到大城市的政策，可能也產生了（可能是意想不到的）效果，將個人與有工作崗位的地區相匹配，即使是非正式地。」
I certainly see that when I look around New York. Yes, we have major issues housing migrants, but we also have a huge pool of informal labourers keeping service costs down in areas such as restaurants and the care economy. I’d love to see fast-tracking of formal work permits for migrants who can fill gaps in tight labour markets. But I’m in the minority; 61 per cent of Americans — and 91 per cent of Republicans — consider illegal immigration a “very serious” problem.
當我在紐約環顧四周時，我當然看到了這一點。是的，我們在爲移民提供住房方面存在重大問題，但我們也有大量的非正規勞動力，降低了餐館和護理經濟等領域的服務成本。我希望看到移民能夠快速獲得正式工作許可，以填補緊張的勞動力市場的空缺。但我屬於少數派；61%的美國人——以及和91%的共和黨人——認爲非法移民是一個「非常嚴重」的問題。
That divide reflects perhaps the most important way in which feelings rather than facts dictate political reality today — the growing partisan divide in economic perceptions. A study published in 2022 by Stanford and New York University scholars found that the gap in how Democrats and Republicans viewed the same economic data doubled between 1999 and 2020. Both parties have moved equally away from the baseline views of independent voters. We’re all partisans now.
這種分歧或許反映了感受而非事實決定當今政治現實的最重要方式——經濟觀念上的不斷加劇的黨派分歧。史丹佛大學(Stanford)和紐約大學(New York University)的學者在2022年發表的一項研究發現，1999年至2020年間，民主黨和共和黨對相同經濟數據的看法差距翻了一番。兩黨都同等程度地偏離了獨立選民的基本觀點。我們現在都是黨派人士了。
What’s more, the divide tends to increase during times of economic recovery, like the Obama years following the great financial crisis, or the Biden boom of today. The study’s authors posit that this may be “because ideologues of all stripes can find economic data or views that flatter their political beliefs”.
更重要的是，在經濟復甦時期，這種分歧往往會擴大，比如金融危機後的歐巴馬時期，或者今天的拜登繁榮時期。該研究的作者認爲，這可能是因爲「各種各樣的理論家都能找到迎合他們政治信仰的經濟數據或觀點」。
That certainly rings true to me. Consider that economically distressed counties representing 8 per cent of US GDP have received 16 per cent of strategic sector investments in things such as clean energy and semiconductors since 2021, thanks to the Biden administration’s focus on place-based economics. Yet because these are long-term plays that take years to funnel through into a felt experience in these communities, many of the people who live in those places may still vote Trump.
這對我來說當然是真的。考慮到自2021年以來，由於拜登政府對地方經濟的關注，佔美國GDP 8%的經濟困難縣在乾淨能源和半導體等領域獲得了16%的戰略部門投資。然而，由於這些都是長期投資，需要數年的時間才能滲透到這些社區的感受中，許多生活在這些地方的人可能仍然會投票給川普。
The facts of Super Tuesday are a known quantity. Instead watch the feelings, and what they might tell us about November.
超級星期二的事實是衆所周知的。相反，我們應該關注感受，以及它們可能告訴我們的關於11月的情況。