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No one should underestimate the mini-miracle that has just occurred in South Africa. The African National Congress, a liberation party that has ruled unchallenged for 30 years, was humbled in a free and fair election last month. It accepted the result, eschewed a potential lurch into radical populism and set about forming a government of national unity in which its main partner will be the market-oriented Democratic Alliance.
任何人都不應低估剛剛在南非發生的小奇蹟。非洲人國民大會(African National Congress，簡稱非國大)，一個統治了30年而沒有受到挑戰的解放黨但在上月舉行的一次自由公正的選舉中敗北。該黨接受了選舉結果，避免了可能陷入激進民粹主義的局面，並著手組建一個民族團結政府，其主要合作伙伴將是以市場爲導向的民主聯盟(Democratic Alliance)。
The prospect of a centrist government bolstered by the DA’s proven administrative skills has energised investors. The rand and the stock market have rallied since the prospect of a coalition government became real. Investors who have not looked at South Africa seriously for 15 years are re-evaluating its prospects.
在民主聯盟久經考驗的行政能力的支援下，一個中間派政府的前景鼓舞了投資者。自組建聯合政府的前景成爲現實以來，南非蘭特和股市已經反彈。15年來沒有認真看待南非的投資者正在重新評估其前景。
But if South Africa has taken the best of all possible post-election paths, no one should underestimate the magnitude of the challenge. The haggling over cabinet positions and more fundamental questions about how the coalition will run foreshadow the pitfalls ahead. It is still possible the DA could withdraw from the coalition altogether if it does not get the posts it believes it deserves.
但是，如果說南非已經走上了大選後可能的最佳道路，那麼任何人都不應低估挑戰的艱鉅性。關於內閣職位的討價還價以及關於聯合政府如何運作的更基本問題都預示著未來的陷阱。如果民主聯盟無法獲得其認爲應得的職位，那麼它仍有可能完全退出聯合政府。
Cyril Ramaphosa, the centrist president, probably sees working with the DA as a chance to neutralise the more radical wing of the ANC and to curb members who see politics as a means of enrichment. But it will not be easy to get the ANC and the DA to work together given their deep ideological divisions, with the DA keener on free enterprise and the ANC on state intervention.
中間派總統西里爾•拉馬福薩可能認爲，與民主聯盟合作是一個機會，可以中和非國大中更激進的一派，並遏制那些將政治視爲致富手段的成員。但是，考慮到非國大和民主聯盟黨在意識形態上的深刻分歧，讓它們合作並不容易，民主聯盟黨更熱衷於企業自由，而非國大則更熱衷於國家干預。
Nor will it be easy to paper over internal divisions within the DA, whose leadership is split between those who see the coalition as a chance to exercise power and others who sense a trap. According to the latter view, the DA could lose its political identity by working with the ANC, which has nearly double the number of MPs. If the DA finds itself in a subservient role, sceptics argue, it could find itself either powerless to effect real change or scapegoated for everything that goes wrong.
要消除民主聯盟內部的分歧也並非易事，該黨領導層分爲兩派，一派認爲聯合是行使權力的機會，另一派則認爲這是個陷阱。後一種觀點認爲，與擁有近兩倍議員人數的非國大合作可能會讓民主聯盟失去自己的政治身份。懷疑論者認爲，如果民主聯盟發現自己處於從屬地位，那麼它可能會發現自己要麼無力實現真正的變革，要麼成爲一切錯誤的替罪羊。
The immediate fight has been over cabinet posts. The DA wanted 12. It will get six if it is lucky. Now the struggle is over ministries. In the latest twist, Ramaphosa is seeking to unpick an agreement that would have seen the DA head the powerful trade and industry ministry. Some ANC cadres cannot stomach the idea of a market-focused party running a ministry that has championed industrial policy, albeit without obvious success.
眼下的鬥爭是圍繞內閣職位展開的。民主聯盟想要12個職位。如果幸運的話，它會得到6個。現在的鬥爭是圍繞各部的。在最新的轉折中，拉馬福薩正在尋求取消一項協議，該協議將由民主聯盟黨領導強大的貿易和工業部。一些非國大幹部無法接受一個以市場爲中心的政黨管理一個倡導產業政策的部門，儘管該政策沒有取得明顯的成功。
Beyond the immediate bartering lies a more fundamental question of whether the DA can run ministries as it wishes or will have to bow to ANC diktat. It has already withdrawn its objection to a minimum wage and to black empowerment legislation that it regards as prone to corruption and inefficiency. Other battles lie ahead, particularly over so-called cadre deployment (parachuting unqualified party hacks into jobs) and the ANC’s ties with unions that often block attempts to reform sectors such as education.
除了眼前的討價還價之外，還有一個更根本的問題，即民主聯盟是否可以按照自己的意願管理各部委，還是不得不屈從於非國大的命令。它已經撤回了對最低工資和黑人賦權立法的反對意見，因爲它認爲這些立法容易導致腐敗和低效。未來還會有其他鬥爭，尤其是所謂的幹部調配（將不合格的黨內雜務人員空降到工作崗位上），以及非國大與工會的關係，後者經常阻撓教育等部門的改革嘗試。
There is a yet bigger obstacle ahead. That is the sheer difficulty of conjuring the rapid growth necessary to tackle the profound economic and social divisions that make South Africa the most unequal society in the world. If 30 years of state intervention have been unable adequately to address the legacy of apartheid, a system that deliberately engineered a Black underclass, it is far from clear that a few market reforms will do the trick either.
還有一個更大的障礙擺在面前。南非是世界上最不平等的社會，要想實現必要的快速成長以解決深層次的經濟和社會分化問題，難度可想而知。如果說30年的國家干預無法充分解決種族隔離制度的遺留問題（這是一種蓄意製造黑人下層階級的制度），那麼一些市場改革也很難奏效。
In five years’ time, the danger is that, even if the coalition holds steady, not enough progress will have been made to convince a skittish electorate. If that is the case, voters may turn to parties offering more populist, but ultimately more dangerous, solutions.
未來5年危險在於，即使聯合政府保持穩定，也不會取得足夠的進展來說服易變的選民。如果是這樣的話，選民們可能會轉向提供更爲民粹主義、但最終更危險的解決方案的政黨。
