In a belated, correct recognition, the European Commission in March called China an economic competitor and “a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance”. One of the most vivid illustrations of this phenomenon is the interest that a string of countries along Europe’s eastern and south-eastern flank, both EU members and not, have shown in Beijing’s invitation to join its Belt and Road Initiative.
今年3月，歐盟委員會(European Commission)將中國稱爲經濟上的競爭對手，「一個系統性的對手，提倡不一樣的治理模式」。儘管有點晚，但這總是一個正確的認識。這種競爭現象的最生動的例證之一，就是歐洲東部和東南部的一連串國家——既有歐盟成員國，也有非歐盟成員國——對中國邀請它們加入「一帶一路」倡議表現出了興趣。
The “17+1” is the informal name for China’s platform to discuss the BRI with the European end of its vast project to tie the Eurasian continent closer together. It captures the balance of influence well: 17 small European countries gathered around one giant. Brussels is right to worry that China is seeking to divide and rule, undermining a collective European policy.
「17+1合作」是中國與參與「一帶一路」倡議的歐洲國家進行討論的平臺的非正式名稱。它充分體現了有關各方的影響力平衡狀況：17個歐洲小國聚集在一個大國的周圍。布魯塞爾方面有理由擔心，中國正尋求分而治之，破壞歐洲的抱團政策。
Surprisingly, perhaps, China is not paying heavily for such influence by sending a lot of foreign direct investment to Europe. In fact European FDI in China is much bigger than the other way round, at least when it comes to greenfield investment rather than mere acquisitions of existing assets. Financially, China should be no match for the EU in its own backyard.
或許令人驚訝的是，中國並沒有透過向歐洲輸送大量外國直接投資(FDI)來爲這種影響力付出高價。事實上，歐洲對華直接投資遠遠大於中國對歐洲的直接投資，至少，如果不談收購現有資產的行爲，在綠地投資方面就是如此。從經濟方面看，在歐盟的後院，中國應該不是歐盟的對手。
