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The writer is chief executive and chief investment officer of Richard Bernstein Advisors
本文作者是 Richard Bernstein Advisors首席執行長兼首席投資官
No economic model would have predicted stocks would be at all-time highs and credit spreads would be very narrow after the Federal Reserve raised its benchmark interest rate by 5.25 percentage points since early 2022. Yet, that is exactly what has happened.
在美聯準(Federal Reserve)自2022年初以來將基準利率上調5.25個百分點之後，沒有任何經濟模型會預測到股市會處於歷史高位，信貸息差會非常窄。然而，這確實發生了。
The Fed seems ready to declare victory in its fight against inflation, but the outperformance of highly speculative investments suggests that even such a sharp increase in interest rates hasn’t been a big enough mop to soak up the excess liquidity sloshing around the financial markets.
美聯準似乎已經準備好宣佈抗擊通膨的勝利，但高度投機性投資的優異表現表明，即使是如此大幅度的加息，也不足以吸乾金融市場上過剩的流動性。
Central banks still don’t seem to understand that financial bubbles are sources of future real asset inflation. Bubbles misallocate capital within an economy to unneeded assets (cryptocurrencies and meme stocks, perhaps?). And capital doesn’t flow to productivity-enhancing investment. Indeed, the US consumer price index finally peaked at 5.6 per cent subsequent to the technology bubble in 2008.
各國央行似乎仍不明白，金融泡沫是未來實際資產通膨的根源。泡沫會將經濟中的資本錯誤地分配到不需要的資產上——也許是加密貨幣和網紅股？——資本不會流向提高生產力的投資。事實上，在2008年科技泡沫之後，美國消費者價格指數最終達到了5.6%的峯值。
There is evidence that speculation could again be curtailing the Fed’s inflation-fighting power, but the central bank seems blind to this. Investors shouldn’t be.
有證據表明，投機可能會再次削弱美聯準對抗通膨的能力，但央行似乎對此視而不見。投資者不應該如此。
Historically, the performance of higher and lower quality has been consistent across asset classes. Smaller capitalisation stocks’ relative performance versus larger stocks tends to mimic credit spreads — the interest rate corporates pay over benchmark levels. That is because smaller, lower-quality companies have greater operating and financial leverage and are more influenced by the economic and profit cycles.
從歷史上看，優質和劣質資產在不同資產類別中的表現是一致的。小盤股票相對於大盤股票的表現往往與信貸息差——企業支付的利率高於基準水準——相似。這是因爲規模較小、質量較低的公司具有更大的經營和財務槓桿，受經濟和利潤週期的影響更大。
In other words, small cap stocks tend to outperform large caps and credit spreads tighten when corporate profits improve, but large caps tend to outperform and credit spreads widen when profits deteriorate.
換句話說，當企業利潤改善時，小盤股的表現往往優於大盤股，信貸息差也會收窄；但當利潤惡化時，大盤股的表現往往優於小盤股，信貸息差也會擴大。
Speculation over the past two years has significantly distorted this long-standing inter-market quality relationship. Large cap stocks have outperformed small cap stocks despite profits accelerating and credit spreads tightening. This has been primarily driven by the so-called Magnificent Seven tech stocks — Apple, Microsoft, Meta, Amazon, Alphabet, Nvidia and Tesla. The result has been a narrow market leadership and an emphasis on higher-quality stocks. Fixed-income performance, however, has been broader, and more cyclical with lower-quality credit benefiting.
過去兩年的投機行爲嚴重扭曲了這種長期存在的市場間質量關係。儘管利潤加速成長，信貸息差收窄，但大盤股的表現卻優於小盤股。這主要是由所謂的七大科技股——蘋果、微軟、Meta、亞馬遜、Alphabet、Nvidia和特斯拉——推動的。其結果是，市場領先優勢縮小，優質股票受到重視。而固定收益的表現則更爲廣泛，且更具週期性，低質量信貸從中受益。
This extreme divergence suggests three possible outcomes. First, the Magnificent Seven’s outperformance might be ignoring the broad improvement in corporate cash flows, whereas narrow credit spreads are correctly accounting for the cyclical upturn. This seems reasonable because the US profits cycle is accelerating and roughly 160 S&P 500 companies now have earnings growth of 25 per cent or more.
這種極端的差異表明了三種可能的結果。首先，「七巨擘」的優異表現可能忽視了企業現金流的廣泛改善，而狹窄的信貸息差則正確地反映了週期性的好轉。這似乎是合理的，因爲美國的盈利週期正在加速，目前大約有160家標準普爾500指數公司的盈利成長達到25%以上。
A second scenario could be that the equity market’s extremely narrow leadership is justified because an apocalyptic credit event is lurking. Goldman Sachs has pointed out the 1930s was the last time equity market leadership was as narrow as it is today.
第二種情況可能是，股市的微弱領先是合理的，因爲一場災難性的信貸事件正在潛伏。高盛指出，上一次股票市場的領導地位像今天這樣狹窄是在上世紀30年代。
Narrow leadership makes economic sense during a depression because companies are struggling to survive let alone grow. Today’s narrow leadership, however, is accompanied by accelerating corporate earnings and a healthy banking system. Thus, a significant credit event of the magnitude that would justify such narrow equity market leadership seems unlikely.
在經濟蕭條時期，微弱的領先在經濟上是合理的，因爲公司正在爲生存而掙扎，更不用說成長了。然而，今天的窄幅領先伴隨著企業盈利的加速和銀行系統的健康。因此，似乎不太可能發生能夠證明這種股市微弱領先地位的重大信貸事件。
A third scenario could be that excess liquidity is fuelling speculation in both the equity and the fixed-income markets, and that neither the Magnificent Seven’s outperformance nor the tight credit spreads are appropriate. There’s certainly evidence of speculation in both markets. If this scenario is the appropriate interpretation, then equity market segments not typically defensive, such as emerging markets and smaller caps, might prove to be havens should the volatility of the current stock market leaders increase.
第三種情況可能是，流動性過剩助長了股市和固定收益市場的投機行爲，「七巨擘」的優異表現和信貸息差的緊縮都是不恰當的。當然，有證據表明這兩個市場都存在投機行爲。如果這種解釋是正確的，那麼如果當前股市領頭羊的波動加劇，新興市場和小盤股等通常不具有防禦性的股市板塊可能會成爲避風港。
Although odd, there is a precedent for this. When the technology bubble began to deflate in March 2000, the overall stock market began the “lost decade” during which the S&P 500 had a modest negative annualised return for 10 years, but energy stocks, commodities, emerging markets, and smaller caps performed extremely well.
雖然奇怪，但這是有先例可循的。2000年3月，科技股泡沫開始破滅，整個股市開始了「失去的十年」，在這十年中，標準普爾500指數的年化收益率爲小幅負值，但能源股、大宗商品、新興市場和小盤股的表現卻極爲出色。
From March 2000 to March 2010, the S&P 500’s annualised total return was negative 0.7 per cent a year and the S&P 500 Technology sector was down 8.0 per cent a year. However, the S&P 500 Energy sector was up 9.4 per cent a year, the S&P Small Cap Index was up 6.6 per cent a year, and MSCI Emerging Market Index was up 10.0 per cent a year.
從2000年3月到2010年3月，標普500指數的年化總回報率爲每年負0.7%，標普500指數科技板塊每年下跌8.0%。然而，標普500能源板塊每年上漲9.4%，標普小型股指數每年上漲6.6%，MSCI新興市場指數每年上漲10.0%。
Those segments benefited from the reallocation of capital away from technology stocks, but also from post-bubble inflation spurring their profits. The Fed’s past could be the prologue. Capital is again being misallocated within the economy, yet the Fed still doesn’t seem to appreciate that misallocated capital kindles future inflation.
這些部門受益於資本從科技股的重新配置，也受益於泡沫後通膨刺激的利潤。美聯準的過去可能就是序幕。資本再次在經濟中被錯誤配置，但美聯準似乎仍未意識到錯誤配置的資本會引發未來的通貨膨脹。