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The writer is former chief of MI6 and UK ambassador to the UN
本文作者曾任軍情六處處長和英國駐聯合國大使
In the past two weeks, Israel has used its huge military advantage, underpinned by AI-enhanced intelligence, to overwhelm Hizbollah. The organisation has lost its top leadership and many of the next generation. Its communications system has been destroyed, as have many of its rocket and missile launch sites. This comes after Hamas’s military capacity has been largely dismantled.
在過去的兩週裏，以色列利用其由AI增強的情報支援的巨大軍事優勢，以壓倒性的力量擊敗了黎巴嫩真主黨(Hizbollah)。該組織失去了最高領導層和許多下一代成員。其通信系統已被摧毀，許多火箭和飛彈發射基地也被摧毀。這是在哈馬斯(Hamas)的軍事能力被大部分瓦解之後發生的。
It feels like we are witnessing a substantial shift in the balance of power in the Middle East, in Israel’s favour and at Iran’s expense.
我們似乎正在目睹中東力量平衡發生重大轉變，這對以色列有利，對伊朗不利。
Since Hamas’s brutal October 7 assault a year ago, Iran has been loud on rhetoric but has done little of substance to protect the militias it helped build up. In his UN speech, President Masoud Pezeshkian put the priority on lifting sanctions — a goal diametrically opposed to getting involved on Hizbollah’s behalf. Iran’s vice-president for strategic affairs, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said recently that supporting the Palestinians didn’t mean going to war for them. Iran seems cowed, lacking the will and military capacity to respond and not prepared to risk instability at home as it enters an uncertain leadership transition.
自從哈馬斯去年10月7日的殘酷襲擊以來，伊朗在言辭上很響亮，但在保護其幫助建立的民兵方面卻幾乎沒有實質性的行動。在聯合國演講中，伊朗總統馬蘇德•佩澤什基安將重點放在解除制裁上，這與代表黎巴嫩真主黨的立場截然相反。伊朗戰略事務副總統穆罕默德•賈瓦德•扎裏夫最近表示，支援巴勒斯坦人並不意味著爲他們而戰。伊朗似乎被嚇住了，缺乏意願和軍事能力作出回應，也不願冒著國內不穩定的風險，因爲它正在進入一個不確定的領導過渡期。
Israel has smelled the weakness in Tehran and is driving home its advantage. No one should feel sorry for Hizbollah — for over 40 years, it has used violence to accumulate power in Lebanon. Those who live by the sword die by the sword.
以色列已經嗅到了德黑蘭的弱點，並正在充分利用這一優勢。沒有人應該爲黎巴嫩真主黨感到遺憾——40多年來，它一直透過暴力在黎巴嫩積累權力。那些以劍爲生的人，終將死於劍下。
How will Hizbollah respond now it has been brought to its knees? It still has the much-vaunted precision missiles which could strike at Israeli cities. Iran may be holding Hizbollah back as these were provided as a deterrent against an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. We don’t know if Iran has a dual key over their use. But if Israel starts to destroy the missile arsenal then Hizbollah may face a “use it or lose it” moment.
黎巴嫩真主黨現在已經被逼到絕境，它將如何回應？它仍然擁有可以打擊以色列城市的備受吹捧的精確飛彈。伊朗可能在阻止黎巴嫩真主黨使用這些飛彈，因爲這些武器是作爲對以色列襲擊伊朗核設施的威懾力量提供的。我們不知道伊朗是否對這些飛彈的使用有雙重控制權。但如果以色列開始摧毀飛彈庫，那麼黎巴嫩真主黨可能會面臨「要麼使用，要麼失去」的時刻。
Widespread Israeli civilian deaths would probably trigger a ground invasion by Israel, which some in Hizbollah might relish — a chance to even the scores in the hostile terrain Israeli forces would have to advance through. For that reason, Benjamin Netanyahu would probably prefer to keep his troops on Israel’s side of the border rather than marching to Beirut’s southern suburbs and to the Bekaa Valley where Hizbollah’s most deadly missiles are probably located. A more limited advance to the Litani River is possible but would leave Israel half in and half out, with no exit strategy.
以色列平民的廣泛死亡可能會引發以色列的地面入侵，這對黎巴嫩真主黨中的一些人來說可能是一個機會——以色列軍隊將不得不在敵對地形中前進，從而扳回局面。因此，本雅明•內塔尼亞胡(Benjamin Netanyahu)可能更願意將部隊留在以色列邊境的一側，而不是向貝魯特的南郊和貝卡谷地(Bekaa Valley)進軍，那裏可能是黎巴嫩真主黨最致命的飛彈所在地。更有限的推進到利塔尼河(Litani River)是可能的，但這將使以色列處於進退兩難的境地，沒有退出策略。
An alternative path for Hizbollah would be a resort to international terrorism. When well-organised regional groups lose their leadership, a more extreme and violent entity can take their place. Isis emerged after more sophisticated opposition groups in Iraq and Syria were dismantled. Killing seasoned political leaders like Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas’s Ismail Haniyeh is a gamble for Israel but one it seems ready for.
黎巴嫩真主黨的另一條道路是訴諸國際恐怖主義。當組織嚴密的地區組織失去領導時，一個更加極端和暴力的實體就會取而代之。伊拉克和敘利亞境內更復雜的反對派組織被瓦解後，伊斯蘭國(Isis)便應運而生。殺死像哈桑•納斯魯拉和哈馬斯的伊斯梅爾•哈尼亞(Ismail Haniyeh)這樣經驗豐富的政治領導人對以色列來說是一場賭博，但以色列似乎已經做好了準備。
Tough military action against Iranian-backed militias dovetails neatly with Israel’s politics, which lean further and further to the right. Enduring stability for Israel will ultimately only come with a political solution in the region. But the same domestic dynamics that are driving Netanyahu to press home Israel’s advantage make a broader political settlement more distant. The best time to engage in a political process is when you are strong and your enemies are weak. But the make-up of Israel’s ruling coalition makes a political initiative with the divided and badly led Palestinians hard to conceive.
對伊朗支援的民兵採取強硬軍事行動與以色列的政治立場完美契合，後者越來越傾向於右翼。以色列的持久穩定最終只能透過地區內的政治解決方案實現。然而，推動內塔尼亞胡利用以色列的優勢的國內動態使更廣泛的政治解決方案變得更加遙遠。參與政治進程的最佳時機是在你強大而敵人虛弱的時候。然而，以色列執政聯盟的構成使得與分裂且領導不善的巴勒斯坦人進行政治倡議難以設想。
It is usually the Americans who try to midwife political progress in the region. But the Biden administration’s power — never very strong in the Middle East — is wilting. It takes months for a new administration to decide on its priorities, and the approaches of Donald Trump and Kamala Harris would be very different. Meanwhile, the Middle East will remain tense and volatile.
通常是美國人試圖在該地區推動政治進展。但是拜登政府在中東地區的影響力——從來都不是很強大——正在減弱。新政府需要幾個月的時間來確定其優先事項，唐納•川普(Donald Trump)和卡瑪拉•哈里斯(Kamala Harris)的方法將大不相同。與此同時，中東局勢將繼續緊張和動盪。
One actor we have heard little from in the past year is Syria. The Syrian regime used to be the arbiter in Lebanon and was willing to kill any Lebanese politician who didn’t bow to diktats from Damascus. The regime is now much weaker after the civil war and Bashar al-Assad is not a patch on his father when it comes to political power plays. But Syria remains relevant as an ally of Iran, Russia and Hizbollah, and a crucial link in Hizbollah’s supply chain.
過去一年我們很少聽到敘利亞的聲音。敘利亞政權曾經是黎巴嫩的仲裁者，並願意殺死任何不服從大馬士革命令的黎巴嫩政治家。經過內戰，敘利亞政權現在變得更加薄弱，阿薩德在政治權力鬥爭方面不如他的父親。但敘利亞作爲伊朗、俄羅斯和黎巴嫩真主黨的盟友，以及黎巴嫩真主黨供應鏈中的關鍵環節，仍然具有重要意義。
Although Hizbollah helped the Assad regime survive in 2013-14, Damascus will want to stay aligned with Iran if it can. It also has bitter memories of the 1982 Lebanon war when the Syrian air force intervened only to be destroyed by Israel. With Iran and Syria focused on their own issues, only the distant Houthis seem up for attacking Israel, so far to little effect. This may be the start of the final chapter for the Axis of Resistance.
儘管黎巴嫩真主黨在2013-2014年幫助阿薩德政權幸存下來，但如果可能的話，大馬士革仍希望與伊朗保持一致。它還對1982年黎巴嫩戰爭懷有痛苦的記憶，當時敘利亞空軍介入，卻被以色列摧毀。由於伊朗和敘利亞專注於自身問題，迄今爲止，只有遙遠的青年運動武裝似乎有攻擊以色列的意願，但效果甚微。這可能是抵抗軸心最後一章的開始。